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Abstract
Under repeated market interaction, reputation and competition
may drive out of the market those firms that do not comply with their
quality promises. One may thus presume that competitive pressure
improves average market quality. This paper shows that the oppo-
site may be true in an endogenous entry, repeated interaction, linear
demand oligopoly model, in which introductory prices may be used
as quality signals. Cheating firms may enter the market, fool even
rational consumers, and exit the market when discovered, implying a
failure of the basic reputation mechanism and an increasing time path
of prices. Markets for closer substitutes tend to have a lower initial
average quality and less trusting consumers, whereas the number of
competitors has no clear relationship with average quality.
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1 Introduction
A buyer purchasing an experience good needs to trust the seller. Confidence
is needed that the effective quality, which is discovered only after purchase,
corresponds to the expected (and paid for) one. Lack of trust may cause
loss of efficient trade opportunities. In general terms, one may say that
compliance with promises by the seller depends on punishment threats and
on efficiency payments (on stick and carrot). Such incentives may be pro-
vided by an external authority, say, the state with its judicial system. Yet,
in some cases compliance is hard to verify and, even when it is verifiable,
state enforcement is generally costly. Alternatively, market interaction might
autonomously shape the adequate incentives. One obvious way is through
repeated interaction and reputation mechanisms, as suggested by Klein and
Leﬄer (1981) and investigated by the subsequent literature discussed below.
When the net return to the investment in reputation is high such mechanisms
work well and guarantee compliance with promises. Yet when it is low they
may fail. When this happens, rational buyers become less trusting and some
sellers cheat on quality.
This paper investigates the dynamic interaction between market struc-
ture and sellers’ trustworthiness when, as it is often observed in markets for
experience goods, reputation fails to guarantee promise compliance and no
other enforcement mechanisms are available. To this end, it displays a dy-
namic oligopoly model, in which promise compliance is conceived as supply
of high quality goods. More specifically, it considers a game with four stages:
entry, quality selection (of an experience good) and twice repeated market
interaction.1
The number of sellers entering the market may be fundamental to deter-
mine incentives for high quality provision, because it affects the net returns
to the investment in reputation. Yet the direction of this effect is not obvi-
ous, as competition may both lower monopoly rents, and thus weaken the
carrot, and offer buyers more alternatives, and thus strengthen the stick.
Moreover, competition itself depends on entry and exit, which depend on
expected profits and therefore on net returns to reputation.2
1In order to focus on market structure and quality choice, I consider price signals of
quality alone and disregard the role of warranties, advertising, brand name investment,
quality disclosure policies and any kind of external enforcement.
2The literature on reputation, discussed below, either takes the number of firms as
given, or does not explicitly model market interaction.
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Upon entry, sellers make a long lasting quality choice, which affects their
variable costs. This corresponds to what happens in many service markets,
in which quality depends on hiring skilled employees, such as financial pro-
moters, auditors, lawyers, doctors, professors, journalists, chefs, mechanics,
and so on, depending on the considered industry.3
In the introductory phase of market interaction, since prices are observed
before purchase and quality is not, prices may be used as signals of quality.4
To focus on the case in which price signals do not allow high quality providers
to separate from low quality ones, I assume that low quality, if recognized
as such, would not be bought at any profitable price. This makes separation
through high prices impossible, because for low quality sellers it is always
profitable to mimic such prices.5 To eliminate the possibility of separation
through low prices, I assume that profits from repeated purchase are insuf-
ficient to compensate the initial losses implied by a credible investment in
reputation.
Given the impossibility of separation, some sellers in equilibrium choose
low quality and cheat rational consumers. When cheating sellers are discov-
ered, they are forced out of the market, whereas high quality ones compete
for repeat purchase at the mature stage of the market. Market dynamics
is therefore characterized by an entry phase followed by a shake-out, a phe-
nomenon widely documented in the product life cycle literature, for instance
by Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper (1996).6 The time path of prices
is rising, since rational consumers correctly anticipate the lower initial av-
erage quality, and therefore demand rises over time. Interestingly, a higher
competitive pressure, due to the fact that different varieties are closer substi-
tutes, reduces initial average market quality and consumers’ trust, because
it reduces relatively more high quality than low quality firms’ profits, due to
3The fact that quality often lasts longer than it takes consumers to experience and find
it out has been neglected by the literature on reputation, which has rather focused on the
short term moral hazard problem of quality choice every period.
4Although I let quality expectations depend on prices alone, without any direct signal-
ing role for the number of entrants, such number has an indirect role, because it determines
equilibrium prices.
5This, in turn, makes consumers skeptical when they observe different market prices,
unless such prices are so low that they cannot be profitably imitated by low quality firms.
6This phenomenon is usually attributed to supply rather than demand factors, namely
sellers’ experimentation with new technologies and varieties, only some of which will turn
out to be successful. By contrast, the explanation proposed here relies on information
diffusion among buyers and on strategic cheating by sellers.
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the fact that high quality firms compete repeatedly. By contrast, no clear
relationship between the number of entrants and average quality and trust
emerges, because entry by a firm of a given quality favors the relative prof-
itability of the other quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses re-
lated literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes its equilib-
rium and Section 5 concludes. Technical lemmas are presented in Appendix.
2 Related literature
The basic mechanism proposed by Klein and Leﬄer (1981) is as follows. If
buyers pay a price premium for high quality, if they are informed on past
compliance and never buy from a seller who cheated on quality in the past,
the present value of the stream of future profits granted by compliance may
be higher than the one period deviation gain that can be obtained by cheating
consumers, so that the seller is indeed induced to be trustworthy. Shapiro
(1983) formally investigates this mechanism and shows that low and rising
prices guarantee high quality in a competitive market, because premiums for
high quality ensure that no firm has an incentive to cut on quality and cheat
the market, but competition for such premiums induces firms to set initially
low, loss-making prices, which correspond to an investment in reputation,
to which later profits are the normal market return. Yet, this result relies
on consumers’ expectations on new products’ quality, which are on average
wrong: it is the fact that consumers (irrationally) mistrust new products’
quality that forces firms to signal high quality through low prices. Subsequent
developments have overcome this limitation.
An important strand of the literature has clarified how a monopolist might
signal private information on quality through either low and rising prices or
through high and declining prices, depending on the role played by taste un-
certainty and information diffusion.7 The analysis has been extended in two
7Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show that a monopolist may signal the exogenous quality
of a newly introduced experience good to rational consumers through low and rising prices,
possibly used together with dissipative advertising. In their model, prices are initially low,
because consumers’ initial uncertainty about their own preferences lowers initial demand,
and in turn initial demand is positively related to the subsequent demand from repeated
purchase. With no uncertainty about preferences, Bagwell and Riordan (1991) argue that
high and declining prices may guarantee high quality, because in principle a high quality
monopolist might separate itself from a low quality one through either low or high initial
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main (partially overlapping) directions. One strand has focused on differ-
ent means to communicate private information on (exogenously determined)
quality, such as warranties, brand name investments, advertising and disclo-
sure policies, under the maintained assumption of monopoly.8 The other one
has discussed how results change under duopoly and oligopoly.9 In all this
literature, market structure and quality are assumed as exogenously given.
Overgaard (1994) and Bester (1998) show that relaxing such assumptions
yields interesting and non standard results.10
As for competitive models, Allen (1984) extends Klein and Leﬄer (1981)
and reconciles quality guaranteeing prices with a competitive market, by
prices, but only high introductory prices are intuitive, in the sense of Cho and Kreps (1987),
and should therefore be expected; moreover, prices decline over time as information about
quality spreads among consumers, reducing the signaling distortion.
8See Lutz (1989) on the role of warranties in presence of consumers’ moral hazard. Lin-
nemer (2002) extends Bagwell and Riordan (1991) by allowing the monopolist to use both
price and advertising signals, and shows that only (high) prices are used for new products,
both signals are used at intermediate levels of information diffusion and no signaling is
needed for mature products. Daughety and Reinganum (2008a) discuss disclosure and
signalling, and Levin et al. (2009) disclosure and competition.
9Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) consider a vertically differentiated duopoly, in
which production costs are constant across qualities (and normalized to zero), and show
that the high quality producer uses (high) price signals alone when quality differentials are
high, and both price and advertising when quality differentials are low. Fluet and Garella
(2002) consider the four possible combinations of the two firms’ quality, assume that high
quality is more costly to produce than low quality, and characterize the parameter space
for which separating equilibria exist and the kind of signal mix that is used. Yehezkel
(2008) considers both price and advertising signals of quality in a vertically differentiated
duopoly. Daughety and Reinganum (2007) discuss the case in which each duopolist’s qual-
ity is its own private information, whereas Daughety and Reinganum (2008b) consider the
case of an n-firm oligopoly.
10Overgaard (1994) shows that potential entry by an uninformed high quality firm may
inefficiently distort an incumbent monopolist’s price upwards, because it strengthens a low
quality incumbent’s incentive to convince both consumers and the potential entrant that
its quality is high, in order to deter entry, and therefore forces a high quality incumbent
to distort its price further up to effectively separate. Bester (1998) shows that uncertainty
on (endogenously chosen) quality may drive duopolists to locate near one another on a
line, because quality guaranteeing prices relax competition. My work is complementary,
since I endogenize the number of firms on the market, rather than the degree of horizontal
differentiation. Huck et al. (2006) find in an experiment that competition fosters trust. The
present paper emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between competitive pressure,
due to higher product substitutability, and competition in the sense of the number of
competitors.
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observing that, if firms produce in the increasing returns to scale range, prices
may be at the same time equal to average cost and higher than marginal
cost, so that no initial investment in reputation is needed to have zero profits.
Cooper and Ross (1984) consider a static competitive framework, with beliefs
similar to those of the present paper: besides finding an analogous result as
Allen (1984) under U-shaped average cost (with the fraction of uninformed
agents serving to equalize cheating firm’s average cost with the unique market
price), they also show that a competitive equilibrium does not exist under
constant returns to scale, thus further motivating my focus on oligopoly.
More recently, Ho¨rner (2002) presents a dynamic version of Klein and
Leﬄer (1981), in which firms enter the market, choose quality every period
and use prices to signal quality. Each firm’s (quality guaranteeing) price
rises over time (as its reputation increases), until bad luck drives it out of
the market. Consumers’ knowledge of a firm’s customer base implies that
it cannot raise its price to mimic higher reputation firms. While this is a
plausible assumption in some contexts, it is often the case that buyers ignore
at the same time sellers’ quality and their customer base, with the implication
that upwards price mimicry is feasible. Besides for this aspect, the present
work also differs from Ho¨rner (2002) because it explicitly considers strategic
interaction, rather than featuring a constant continuous mass of firms on the
market.
A limited number of recent papers deal with dynamic oligopolistic in-
teraction with quality choice. Kranton (2003) displays a homogenous good
model in which competition for (uncertain) market shares may prevent prices
from assuring high quality. Bar-Isaac (2005) provides an example in which,
with quantity being chosen but not used as a quality signal, a high quality
equilibrium exists for either low or high degrees of substitutability, but not
at intermediate levels. Dana and Fong (2008) show that, with firms rather
than consumers punishing deviators, reputation for high quality is easier to
maintain under oligopoly than under monopoly or competitive market. All
three of these papers maintain the number of firms as exogenously given.
This limitation is removed in Toth (2008), who presents a dynamic oligopoly
model with stochastic entry and with investment in quality every period, and
shows that market concentration may alleviate moral hazard. Yet his work
is focused on firms’ survival contest and does not present an explicit model
of market interaction (in particular, prices are not used as signals of quality).
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3 Model
3.1 Structure
I consider a game with the following four-stage structure. At stage oneN ∈ N
firms simultaneously decide whether to enter the market or not. Each enter-
ing firm pays a fixed entry cost ζ > 0, which is sunk after entry, and chooses
a different variety of an experience good. Varieties are imperfect substitutes.
The number of firms who enter the market is denoted by n. At stage two the
n firms on the market simultaneously choose whether to produce high or low
quality. The result of these choices is a vector z ∈ {0, 1}n, with zj = 1 mean-
ing that firm j has chosen high quality. Denote h =
∑n
j=1 zj the number of
high quality firms. Once decided, the quality level remains the same in the
two following market stages. To simplify and concentrate only on asymmetric
information on consumers’ side, I assume that, once chosen, a firm’s quality
becomes known to all firms on the market, but not to consumers. Consumers
may learn a firm’s quality either through direct experience with its products
or by information extraction from equilibrium price signals. At stage three
firms and consumers interact on the market for the first time. They move
sequentially: first, firms simultaneously choose prices, determining a price
vector p1 ∈ Rn+. Next, having observed p1, consumers (indeed, a represen-
tative consumer) decide how much to demand to each firm, determining the
demand vector q1 ∈ Rn+. Stage four is analogous to stage three, but con-
sumers now have additional information: if they have consumed a positive
quantity of a firm’s product, they are fully informed about its quality. Again,
first firms simultaneously choose prices and determine the new price vector
p2 ∈ Rn+ and then consumers choose the new demand vector q2 ∈ Rn+.
3.2 Preferences and technology
Preferences are assumed in such a way as to generate linear demands. This
is done by extending a model first presented by Shubik and Levitan (1980)
and more recently used by Motta (2004). I assume the following expected
utility function:
U(q, e) =
n∑
j=1
α(ej)qj − n
2(1 + µ)
 n∑
j=1
q2j +
µ
n
(
n∑
j=1
qj
)2+ y, (1)
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where e ∈ [0, 1]n is a vector of beliefs, i.e., its elements are the probability
attributed by the representative consumer to the fact that each good is of
high quality, conditional on information about previous play of the game
(which I omit to write for notational simplicity): ej = Pr{zj = 1}; α(ej)
reflects the utility value attributed to good j’s expected quality, defined as
α(ej) = β + ejγ, where β ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 are parameters: β captures the
value attributed to a unit of a low quality good and γ the additional value
of high over low quality; µ ∈ [0,∞) is a parameter capturing the degree
of substitutability between different varieties; y is a perfectly competitive
outside good, introduced only to make partial equilibrium analysis justified.
This representation extends Shubik and Levitan (1980) and Motta (2004) by
allowing for imperfect observability and product-specific quality, two features
which are absent in the baseline model (which may be seen as corresponding
to the special case in which ∀j, α(ej) = α > 0, a known parameter).
One feature of this model is that (at interior consumers’ choices) market
size does not depend upon either the degree of substitutability or the number
of products, but only upon average expected quality and average price. To see
this, notice that maximization with respect to q of (1) under an exogenous
income constraint (and given prices and beliefs) implies the system of n
FOC’s ∂U
∂qj
= α(ej) − 11+µ (nqj + µ
∑n
i=1 qi) = pj, by inverting which one
obtains each product’s demand
qj(p, e, n) =
1
n
{[
n+ µ(n− 1)
n
]
[α(ej)− pj]− µ
n
∑
i 6=j
[α(ek)− pk]
}
, (2)
or, in matrix notation, q(p, e, n) = E(n) · [α(e) − p], where E(n) is an
n× n matrix with elements Eii(n) = n+µ(n−1)n2 and Eik(n) = − µn2 , α(e) is the
vector of α(ej)’s and p is the price vector
11. The size of the market is then
Q(p, e, n) ≡ ∑nj=1 qj(p, e, n) = 1n∑nj=1[α(ej) − pj] = α¯ − p¯. In the special
case in which all products are expected to be of the same quality α and have
the same price p, individual demands are simply qj =
α−p
n
.
Although I later let consumers’ beliefs depend upon the previous history
of play, it is useful to see how firms with constant returns to scale react to
this demand under exogenous quality expectations. In this case, the general
11The procedure to invert the system of FOC’s is analogous to that described in Motta
(2004, pp. 578-579), and is not reported here. Clearly, equation (2) characterizes demand
only when all the FOC’s hold with equality.
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expression of Nash equilibrium prices can be calculated12. If all firms have
the same marginal cost c and all products are expected to be of the same
quality α(e) > c, this expression simplifies to
pE(n, e, c) =
nα(e) + [n+ µ(n− 1)]c
2n+ µ(n− 1) , (3)
which is increasing in e and c, decreasing in n and µ, converges to c as µ→∞
and further simplifies to the usual monopoly price α(e)+c
2
if n = 1.
To later consider deviations from equilibrium, notice that if firm j man-
ages to convince consumers that it is the only one offering high quality, i.e.,
if ej = 1 and ∀i 6= j, ei = 0, then ∀n > 0 and ∀p such that pj < α(1)
and pi ≥ α(0) ∀i 6= j, it holds that qj(p, e, n) = 1+µn+µ [α(1) − pj] and
∀i 6= j, qi(p, e, n) = 013.
All goods are produced with a constant returns to scale technology, with
higher quality being more expensive to produce. Marginal costs of low and
high quality are cL ≥ 0 and cH > cL, respectively. Firms can always exit the
market if it is in their interest to do so.
3.3 Equilibrium concept and parameter restrictions
I look for a pure strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (WPBE) of the
entire game and restrict attention to equilibria that are symmetric, in the
sense that all firms choosing the same quality also set the same price. Since
several equilibria are possible, depending on how consumers form quality
expectations based on observed prices, and on how firms use prices to signal
(or hide) their quality, I restrict attention to a simple class of belief functions
(specified below), characterized by the fact that consumers distrust price
12Let c be the vector of marginal costs. Nash equilibrium prices are pEj (n, e, c) =
n+µ(n−1)
[2n+µ(2n−1)][2n+µ(n−1)]
{[
n2(1+µ)
n+µ(n−1) + n+ µ(n− 1)
]
α(ej) + n(2 + µ)cj + µ
∑
i 6=j [ci − α(ei)]
}
.
13The reason why firm j’s demand depends on n is that, although j is the only one
selling a positive quantity, it is not the only one initially on the market. Consumers are
‘tempted’ by the other goods, although they do not buy them: the presence of other firms
posting prices and offering their products reduces the marginal utility derived from j’s
good, so that j is able to sell at pj a lower quantity than it would, at the same price, if it
were alone on the market (i.e., if n = 1). Technically, only j’s FOC holds with equality,
whereas all the other ones hold with strict inequality. Notice that, given n > 1 and p,
j’s demand increases in µ, since a higher degree of substitutability reduces consumers’
temptation from different goods.
9
signals whenever they are easy to imitate, and, if imitation occurs, to intuitive
prices, which are the most profitable ones for high quality firms, given that
low quality firms set the same price. Three assumptions will be used in the
analysis and are introduced and discussed here. Let γ¯ ≡ N+2(1+
√
N+1)
N
(cH −
cL).
14
Assumption 1. α(0) = cL
Assumption 2. α(1) > cH
Assumption 3. γ < γ¯
Under perfect information, Assumption 1, which equalizes the intrinsic
utility of low quality goods and their production cost, makes demand for low
quality goods insufficient even for the profitable entry of a single low quality
monopolist, since its demand would be positive only at prices strictly below
marginal cost. This implies that, under imperfect information, firms can
profitably produce goods only as long as they manage to convince consumers
of their high quality (or count to recoup initial losses in the future). It
also implies that separation (of high from low quality firms) through upward
distorted prices is impossible, because, if any price above cL were a credible
signal of high quality, it would be imitated by low quality firms, thus losing
its credibility.
Assumption 2 is needed to ensure that high quality firms receive positive
demand in equilibrium. Given Assumption 1, it is equivalent to γ > cH − cL,
so that the utility difference between high and low quality is higher than
their cost difference.15
Assumption 3 rules out the possibility that high quality firms separate
from low quality ones by pricing at cL, because in that case initial losses
would not be compensated by future profits.
Assumption 1 implies that low quality firms, if recognized as such, leave
the market.16 By Assumption 2, high quality firms, if recognized as such, stay
14The origin of γ¯ is made clear in the proof of Proposition 3 below. Notice that γ¯ is
unboundedly increasing in (cH − cL) and decreasing in N , with limN→∞ γ¯ = (cH − cL),
but with γ¯ > (cH − cL) for any finite N .
15This implies that an expected increase in firm j’s competitors’ quality makes them
more competitive and therefore forces j to react by lowering its own price.
16I assume that firms leave the market if they expect zero profits, thus resolving the
indifference case. An arbitrary small cost of staying on the market would fully rationalize
it.
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on the market and price according to (3). This is reflected in the full infor-
mation equilibrium at stage 4, captured by Proposition 1. By the same logic,
it is impossible that at stage 3 both high and low quality firms stay on the
market and set two different prices (Proposition 2). This justifies our focus
on beliefs that support equilibria with pooling prices. If high quality firms
are able to separate themselves from low quality ones through low prices,
then the market dries up for low quality firms, and these are forced out of
the market, implying that nobody at stage 2 would choose low quality.17 Yet,
under Assumption 3, high quality firms are unable to set a quality-assuring
introductory price (Proposition 3), so that the price they set is imitated by
low quality firms (Proposition 4).18 Then whether firms choose low or high
quality at stage 2 depends on the balance between higher initial profits from
cheating and repeated purchase profits from compliance (Proposition 5). Fi-
nally, entry costs determine the number of entrants, thus closing the model
and allowing to make comparative statics exercises (Proposition 6).
In what follows I formalize and deepen the implications of these assump-
tions. I order firms on the market by assigning lower indices to high quality
ones. I start solving the model by backward induction, establishing sequential
rationality of strategies and deferring to the end the consistency requirement
between beliefs and strategies along the equilibrium path of play.
4 Analysis
4.1 Stage 4: second market interaction
When consumers choose demand in the last move before the game ends, they
are fully informed about the quality of goods on the market, because they
have already experienced them. In other words, beliefs are e2j(p
1,q1,p2) = zj
if q1j > 0
19. I assume e2j = 0 if q
1
j = 0, to rule out the possibility that a firm
finds it optimal to produce only at stage 4. Thus consumers never buy either
goods indexed j > h, because they know these goods are of low quality,
17In a companion paper (Vanin, 2009) I show that if, in violation of Assumption 3, γ
is sufficiently high, then the reputation mechanism (through low and rising prices) indeed
grants high quality.
18Given this, I focus on the price that is most profitable for high quality firms (and that
in this sense is intuitive).
19The superscript 2 is due to the fact that beliefs are relevant only in the two stages of
market interaction and stage 4 is the second one.
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or goods they have not experienced in the first stage of market interaction,
because they expect them to be of low quality. Anticipating this behavior,
all low quality firms exit the market, together with all firms that did not
previously sell a positive quantity. High quality firms stay on the market
and, taking as given other firms’ prices, set their own profit maximizing
price. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (unique stage 4 equilibrium)
Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. For any n ≥ 0, h ∈ {0, . . . , n},p1 and
q1, there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the corresponding
stage 4 subgame, at which all firms remaining on the market receive strictly
positive demand: all firms that at stage 3 did not sell anything (if any) exit
the market; among firms that at stage 3 sold positive quantities, low quality
ones (if any) exit the market and high quality ones (if any) set prices, re-
ceive demand and make profits as follows: ∀j ∈ {1, ..., h} : q1j > 0, p2j =
pE(h, 1, cH) = p
2(h), q2j = qj(p
2, e2, h) = q2(h) and pi2j = pi
2(h), where
p2(h) =
hα(1) + [h+ µ(h− 1)]cH
2h+ µ(h− 1) , (4)
q2(h) =
h+ µ(h− 1)
h[2h+ µ(h− 1)] [α(1)− cH ], (5)
pi2(h) =
h+ µ(h− 1)
[2h+ µ(h− 1)]2 [α(1)− cH ]
2. (6)
Proof. Suppose first all firms produce a positive quantity at stage 3, so their
quality is known at stage 4. By Assumption 1, once its quality is known, any
low quality firm receives zero demand if it stays on the market, at any price
(weakly) higher than its marginal cost, independently of what other firms do.
Thus, whatever h ∈ {0, . . . , n}, low quality firms indeed choose to exit and
high quality firm’s best response (if h ≥ 1) is indeed to stay on the market
and set their profit maximizing price. See Motta (2004), formulae (8.65) and
(8.66) on p. 569, for the precise expression of high quality firms’ choices.
Now, by the assumption that e2j = 0 if q
1
j = 0, any firm, which does not
produce at stage 3, is forced out of the market at stage 4 as well, since it is
regarded as a low quality firm.20
20To account for subgames in which some high quality firms do not produce at stage 3,
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Observe that full information prices, quantities and profits in (4), (5) and
(6) are all decreasing in the number of high quality firms.
4.2 Stage 3: first market interaction
At stage 3 (first market interaction) firms set prices p1, consumers observe
them, formulate beliefs on each firm’s quality and then choose demand.
While at stage 4 any collection of previous histories of play identifies a proper
subgame, this is not the case at stage 3, because, for any n, any price vec-
tor p1 ∈ Rn+ identifies one information set for the representative consumer,
independently of z ∈ {0, 1}n. To analyze the game, we need to specify each
firm’s introductory price after any possible n > 0 and z ∈ {0, 1}n, since this
identifies any possible information set at which firms may be called to set
prices.21
I first show that no pure strategy equilibria exist, in which both low
and high quality firms are present and choose different introductory prices.
Hence, I subsequently focus on equilibria with pooling introductory prices.
I specify beliefs which are best suited to support such equilibria, introduce
an intuitive introductory price function and show its sequential rationality
given these beliefs under Assumption 3.
Proposition 2. (no equilibria with separation)
Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. There exist no pure strategy weak perfect
in expressions (4), (5) and (6) h should be replaced by the cardinality of the set {j ∈ N :
j ≤ h, q1j > 0}. I write just h to reduce the notational burden, given that such subgames
are out of equilibrium.
21Recall that firms’ quality is not randomly determined by Nature, but is rather chosen
by each firm at stage 2. If such quality choice is in pure strategies, and if consumers
can identify each firm and correctly anticipate its equilibrium strategy, then, even after
observing a pooling price at stage 3 (at least as long as this price is along the equilibrium
path of play), consumers would be able to precisely anticipate each firm’s quality. Yet,
given firms’ initial symmetry to consumers’ eyes, it is more interesting and reasonable to
assume that, upon observing a pooling price (at least on the equilibrium path of play),
consumers may extract information about average quality, but cannot precisely identify
which firm has chosen which quality. To make this idea formally consistent with equilib-
rium, one may either let firms choose their quality in mixed strategies, or allow Nature to
initially randomly choose, for any possible n, a permutation of the n firms (drawn from
a uniform distribution), and assume that consumers cannot observe this move by Nature.
This second route is chosen here and it means that any firms setting the same price are
initially indistinguishable for consumers.
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Bayesian equilibria, in which, along the equilibrium path of play, at stage 3
both high and low quality firms are present on the market and set two different
prices (one for each quality level).
Proof. Suppose such an equilibrium exists. By observing two prices on the
market, consumers infer each firm’s quality. Then the result follows from the
proof of Proposition 1.
Beliefs
It is convenient to specify consumers’ beliefs in terms of a prior e0, which
is updated upon observation of the introductory price vector, because such
prior may be interpreted as the degree of consumers’ initial trust in firms’
product quality, which is assumed to be common knowledge.
When n firms post their price at stage 3, and consumers have a prior e0 ∈
[0, 1], the space of possible posterior beliefs is the set of all functions e1 : Rn+×
[0, 1] → [0, 1]n : (p1, e0) 7→ e1(p1, e0), mapping prices and prior to quality
expectations. In order to study equilibria with pooling introductory prices, I
restrict attention to a specific simple class of beliefs, which is especially likely
to support such equilibria: ∀n > 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}, ∀p1 ∈ Rn+, ∀e0 ∈ [0, 1],
e1j(p
1, e0) =

e0 , if ∃p1 ∈ (cL, α(1)) : ∀i, p1i = p1
1 , if pj ≤ cL
0 , otherwise
(7)
This means that, upon observing a pooling introductory price (in the
range of profitable prices for low quality firms), consumers receive no infor-
mation from price signals and do not revise their prior.22.
If a firm’s price is (weakly) lower than cL, then consumers conclude it
must be a high quality firm. Indeed, at such introductory price no firm
makes positive initial profits, but only a high quality firm may expect to
recoup initial losses at stage 4, whereas a low quality firm, expecting to exit
at stage 4, would never stay on the market unless at stage 3 it can price
above its marginal cost.
22Differently from what happens in Bayesian games, the prior is not implied by an
exogenous type distribution. If in equilibrium n∗ firms enter the market, h∗ of them
choose high quality, and all of them set the same introductory price p1 ∈ (cL, α(1)), then
beliefs (7) imply e1j (p
1, e0) = e0 ∀j, so Bayes’ rule implies e0 = h∗n∗ . If in equilibrium p1
does not belong to (cL, α(1)), then Bayes’ rule imposes no restrictions on the prior, since
e0 does not affect posterior beliefs along the equilibrium path of play.
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Further, beliefs (7) entail a high degree of distrust in price signals (not
to be confused with trust in product quality, captured by the prior), in the
sense that, if different prices are observed on the market, consumers interpret
any price, at which low quality firms could make profits, as a trial to cheat
them, and hence expect low quality. Indeed, if low quality firms anticipated
that consumers are going to interpret a certain price deviation as a signal
of high quality, they would deviate themselves to such price, as long as it is
above their marginal cost. That is why no deviation above cL is a credible
signal.
In summary, I am considering an environment in which consumers do not
trust price signals, because they are too easy to imitate, unless they convey
the information that a firm is indeed willing to incur losses to build a good
reputation, losses that low quality firms could never recoup.
Introductory prices, quantities and profits
I consider each firm’s strategy as specifying an introductory price func-
tion of the form p1(n, h, e0).23 When all potential entrants adopt the same
p1(n, h, e0), I call it a pooling introductory price function.24
Consider a pooling introductory price function p1(n, h, e0). Given e0 ∈
[0, 1], at any stage 3 information set such that n > 0 and h ∈ {0, . . . , n},
denoting p1 = p1(n, h, e0) and e1 = e1(p1, e0), if p1 < α(e1), then each firm j
on the market expects to receive demand according to (2) as qj(p
1, e1, n) =
q1(p1, e1, n) (where p1 and e1 denote the n×1 vectors whose elements are all
p1 and e1, respectively), so that initial profits for low and high quality firms
are pi1L(p
1, e1, n) and pi1H(p
1, e1, n), respectively, where
q1(p1, e1, n) =
α(e1)− p1
n
, (8)
pi1L(p
1, e1, n) = (p1 − cL) · q1(p1, e1, n), (9)
pi1H(p
1, e1, n) = (p1 − cH) · q1(p1, e1, n), (10)
23Since e0 is common knowledge, introductory prices may depend on it. To study
equilibria with pooling introductory prices, it is enough to summarize z through h. This
will imply some slight abuse of language when talking about firms’ stage 3 information
sets. Such imprecisions are immaterial to the analysis and simplify the exposition.
24Observe that in this case consumers’ quality expectations at stage 3 are the same for
all firms and, using (7), can be written as e1(p1, e0), where p1 = p1(n, h, e0).
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Overall profits
From equations (6), (7), (9), (10), letting again p1 = p1(n, h, e0) and e1 =
e1(p1, e0), define low and high quality firms’ overall expected profits at a pool-
ing price p1 < α(e1) as piL(n, h, p
1, e1) ≡ pi1L(p1, e1, n) and piH(n, h, p1, e1) ≡
pi1H(p
1, e1, n) +pi2(h), respectively. At any price p1 ≥ α(e1), any firm receives
zero demand and expects zero overall profits: in this case, let piL(n, h, p
1, e1) =
0 and piH(n, h, p
1, e1) = 0. If n > 1, denote a firm’s overall deviation prof-
its, if it sets p 6= p1 when all other firms set p1, as pi′L(n, h, p, p1, e′) and
pi′H(n, h, p, p
1, e′), for a low and a high quality firm respectively, where e′ is
still derived from (7), but taking into account that the deviating firm prices
at p and all the other ones price at p1. In particular, if n ≥ h > 0, e0 > 0
and p1 > cL, then by deviating to p = cL, a high quality firm earns overall
deviation profits pi′H(n, h, cL, p
1, 1) = −(cH − cL)
(
1+µ
n+µ
)
γ + pi2(1).
Sequential rationality
To be part of a WPBE, a pooling introductory price function must be se-
quentially rational.25 In particular, it must specify a sequentially rational
price for a monopolist. Lemma 1 in Appendix shows that an implication of
Assumptions 1 and 2 is that a high quality monopolist has no sequentially
rational introductory prices if α(e0) ∈ (cL, cH ].26 Noting that α(e0) ∈ (cL, cH ]
is equivalent to e0 ∈
(
0, cH−cL
γ
]
, restricts the initial levels of trust, for which
we may find sequentially rational pooling introductory price functions, to
e0 ∈ {0} ∪
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
.
Proposition 3 shows the key implication of Assumption 3, together with
beliefs (7), namely that a necessary condition for sequential rationality of a
25Suppose everybody expects that at stage 4 the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium
is played. A pooling introductory price function p1(n, h, e0) is sequentially rational given
beliefs (7), with e0 ∈ [0, 1], if at any stage 3 information set at which firms choose (hence,
∀n > 0, ∀h ∈ {0, . . . , n}), it specifies a price p1, which is sequentially rational (given such
beliefs and at the corresponding information set) for each firm on the market, provided all
other firms set the same price (i.e., ∀p 6= p1 it holds that, if h < n, then piL(n, h, p1, e1) ≥
pi′L(n, h, p, p
1, e′), and if h > 0, then piH(n, h, p1, e1) ≥ pi′H(n, h, p, p1, e′), where e′ is derived
from (7), taking into account that the deviating firm prices at p and all the other ones
price at p1).
26In this case, it must incur initial losses if it wants to sell a positive quantity. But then
it has no profit maximizing initial price, since, from any price at which demand is strictly
positive, a slight price increase would reduce initial losses.
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pooling introductory price function is that it does not involve investment in
reputation. Indeed, when high quality, relative to low quality, is not much
more important to consumers than more costly to firms, repeated purchase
is not enough remunerative to justify the initial losses incurred to invest in
reputation.27
Proposition 3. (no investment in reputation)
Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. If a pooling introductory price function
p1(n, h, e0) is sequentially rational given beliefs (7), then ∀(n, h) : N ≥ n ≥
h ≥ 1, ∀e0 ∈ {0} ∪
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, p1(n, h, e0) > cL.
Proof. Given γ < γ¯, high quality firms would deviate from a pooling intro-
ductory price equal to cL, since at that price they make negative profits.
Indeed, ∀(n, h) : N ≥ n ≥ h ≥ 1, piH(n, h, cL, 1) ≤ piH(N, 1, cL, 1); and
piH(N, 1, cL, 1) < 0 ⇐⇒ γ < γ¯.
Recall that along the equilibrium path of play posterior beliefs at stage 3
must correctly reflect average market quality, and that if they specify e1 = 0,
then markets are closed. According to (7) e1 = e0 if equilibrium introductory
prices pool on some p1 ∈ (cL, α(1)). In light of Proposition 3, equilibrium
pooling prices must be above cL. If they were (weakly) above α(1), then mar-
kets would be closed. It follows that no equilibria exist with active markets,
pooling introductory prices and e0 = 0. Together with the above mentioned
result, that sequentially rational pooling introductory price functions require
e0 ∈ {0} ∪
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, this implies the following remark.
Remark 1. (high trust)
Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. A necessary condition for existence of
a WPBE with beliefs (7), active markets and pooling introductory prices is
e0 > cH−cL
γ
, that is, α(e0) > cH .
Given e0 > cH−cL
γ
and Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, necessary and sufficient
conditions for a pooling price function to be sequentially rational are stated
in Lemma 2 in Appendix. The main message can be summarized as follows.
27Formally, Assumption 3 adds to Assumptions 1 and 2 the following implications: first,
∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it holds that piH(n, h, cL, 1) < 0; second, if p1 > cL,
then pi′H(n, h, cL, p
1, 1) < 0. In a different setting, a short time horizon or a high discount
rate would have the analogous effect of reducing the repeated purchase incentive to invest
in reputation.
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If consumers were to believe any price signal that can be profitably imitated
by low quality firms, these latter firms would obviously send the same signal.
Thus, price signals are not credible, unless they cannot be profitably imitated.
This would be the case of prices (weakly) below cL, but under low γ such
prices are not profitable. When consumers distrust price signals, it becomes
profitable for firms to coordinate on a single price, which yields positive
profits to all firms (or initial losses for high quality firms, later recouped
through future gains).28 Provided firms coordinate, there may be several
profitable pooling prices.29 Yet pooling prices are uninformative signals, so
that consumers’ demand depends on their initial trust e0. If they distrust
product quality so much that they are never induced to try it, the natural
consequence is that no firm finds it profitable to start selling, so all markets
remain closed. If, by contrast, e0 > 0, then I focus on the most intuitive
pooling pricing function, which has firms setting the most profitable price
for high quality firms, given that low quality firms, whenever this is rational,
set the same price pE(n, e0, cH).
30
Definition 1. (intuitive pooling introductory price function)
Let the pooling introductory price function p1E(n, h, e
0) be defined as follows.
If e0 = 0, then all markets remain closed. ∀e0 ∈ (0, 1], firms set p1E(1, 0, e0) =
pE(1, e0, cL) and p
1
E(n, h, e
0) = pE(n, e0, cH) in any other case.
Proposition 4. (seq. rationality of intuitive introductory prices)
Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. The pooling introductory price function
p1E(n, h, e
0) is sequentially rational if and only if e0 ∈ {0} ∪
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
.
Proof. If e0 = 0, expected demand and profits are zero at any price, so no
profitable deviation is possible. By Lemma 1 in Appendix, p1E(1, 1, e
0) is not
28Obviously, no coordination issues arise for monopolists, whose unique sequentially
rational price, given e0 > cH−cLγ , is determined by equation (3).
29Equilibrium refinements developed for signaling games cannot be straightforwardly
applied to the present game and the application of more general refinements turns out to
be prohibitively complex. Yet, it can be shown that a reasonable application of forward
induction arguments, in the spirit of the intuitive criterion introduced by Cho and Kreps
(1987), does not eliminate this multiplicity.
30See Vanin (2007) for an analysis of sequential rationality of the simplest class of pooling
price functions: those in which firms set the same price both on and off the equilibrium
path of play, so that the price schedule is flat in n and in h. That analysis is omitted here,
because the gain in simplicity is not compensated by the loss in plausibility.
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sequentially rational if e0 ∈
(
0, cH−cL
γ
]
, so the same is true for the entire
function p1E(n, h, e
0). Given e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, it is easy to check that, under
Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, all the conditions of Lemma 2 in Appendix hold for
p1E(n, h, e
0).
So the intuitive introductory price schedule, whereby low quality oligopolists
act as if they had high quality goods, is sequentially rational, given beliefs
(7), when trust is either zero (in which case markets are closed) or high (in
which case they are open).
4.3 Stage 2: quality choice
At stage 2 the n firms on the market simultaneously choose whether to spe-
cialize their technology to produce high or low quality goods. This choice
determines whether their marginal cost in the two subsequent periods will
be cH or cL, respectively. Indeed, firms’ strategies must specify such qual-
ity choice at any possible stage 2 information set31. This yields a vector
of quality choice profiles z(n, e0). To investigate its sequential rational-
ity, given the intuitive pooling introductory price function p1E(n, h, e
0), let
piEi (n, h, e
0) ≡ pii (n, h, p1E(n, h, e0), e1(p1E(n, h, e0), e0)), for i ∈ {L,H}.32
For e0 = 0 firms are indifferent between choosing either quality and ex-
iting the market. Thus in particular market exit if e0 = 0 is sequentially
rational at stage 2.
31Order the N potential entrants so that if n of them enter the market, it is the first
ones who do. Any potential entrant i’s strategy should specify a quality choice for any
n ≥ i (i.e., whenever it enters the market) and for any possible permutation of n. To
simplify, I assume symmetry in position-contingent quality choice sequences, so that for
any potential entrant i, its strategy specifies, ∀n ≥ i, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, zij(n), i.e., its
quality choice whenever it enters the market, together with (n − 1) other firms, and is
assigned position j in a permutation. Symmetry also implies that ∀n > 0, ∀i, j, k ∈
{1, . . . , n}, zij(n) = zkj (n) = zj(n). Thus, ∀n > 0, consumers face the same vector z(n),
independently of the particular permutation of n.
32Suppose everybody expects that that at stage 3 all firms pool on the intuitive intro-
ductory price function p1E(n, h, e
0), and that at stage 4 the unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium is played. A sequence of quality choice profiles z(n, e0) is sequentially rational
if ∀n > 0, the number of high quality firms h(n, e0) = ∑nj=1 zj(n, e0) satisfies the fol-
lowing properties: if h(n) > 0, then piEH
(
n, h(n, e0), e0
) ≥ piEL (n, h(n, e0)− 1, e0); and if
h(n, e0) < n, then piEL
(
n, h(n, e0), e0
) ≥ piEH (n, h(n, e0) + 1, e0).
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Lemma 3 in Appendix investigates sequential rationality of quality choice
profiles when e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. It first
shows that a monopolist chooses low quality, because the additional demand
granted by re-purchase of high quality goods is not sufficient to compensate
for their additional cost. Next, for n > 1, it implies that sequentially ratio-
nal quality choices depend on the initial level of consumers’ trust and on the
number of firms on the market in the following way.
Proposition 5. (trust, competition and market quality)
Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Assume that prices are set according to the
pooling introductory price function p1E(n, h, e
0) at stage 3, and that the unique
Nash equilibrium is played at stage 4. ∀n ∈ {2, . . . , N}, ∃eB(n), eT (n) :
cH−cL
γ
< eB(n) < eT (n), such that sequentially rational quality choices depend
on consumers’ trust in the following way.
1. Low trust implies full high quality, i.e., if e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, eB(n)
)
, then
h(n, e0) = n characterizes sequentially rational quality choice profiles.
2. High trust and low competition may imply full low quality, i.e., if e0 ∈
(eT (n), 1] (which is an empty interval for high n), then h(n, e
0) = 0
characterizes sequentially rational quality choice profiles.
3. If either trust is at intermediate levels or both trust and competition
are sufficiently high, i.e., if e0 ∈ [eB(n), eT (n)] (for high n, eT (n) > 1),
then sequentially rational quality choice profiles are characterized by ini-
tial coexistence on the market of both high and low quality firms. Aver-
age market quality falls into an interval of length 1/n, whose boundaries
decrease in consumers’ trust.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3 in Appendix and the fact that eB(n) and
eT (n) there defined are respectively decreasing and increasing.
Low trust implies low initial demand, so that high quality is always more
profitable than low quality, independently of the number of competitors, since
it yields profits from repeated purchase. High trust makes the initial profit
advantage of low quality firms higher, the more so, the lower the number of
competitors, so that in particular a combination of high trust and low com-
petition may induce all firms to cheat the market. For intermediate trust
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levels, given n, average quality decreases in trust; yet, given e0, average mar-
ket quality needs not be a monotonic function of n. The reason is that entry
of additional low quality firms makes high quality relatively more profitable,
and entry of additional high quality firms tends to make low quality rela-
tively more profitable. Thus, although a proportional increase in n and h
raises the relative profitability of low quality, so that, if we take a sufficiently
long sequence of n, a decreasing trend in average quality, as determined by
sequentially rational choices, should be detectable, this may not be the case
when N is low, since then discrete jumps in n and h may determine non
monotonic jumps in average quality, with no observable trend.
4.4 Stage 1: entry and consistency
At stage 1 firms decide whether to enter the market or not. Given Assump-
tions 1, 2 and 3, beliefs (7) and e0, under the above considered sequentially
rational continuation of the game, the following holds. If e0 = 0, then overall
expected profits are zero and the entry cost is not worth paying, so that in
equilibrium n = 0 and all markets are closed.33 If e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, then
overall expected profits, for both high and low quality firms, are decreasing
in n, so that the sequentially rational number of entrants is uniquely deter-
mined as the highest integer such that each firm’s overall expected profits are
higher than the fixed entry cost ζ. This yields n as an increasing function of
e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
.
At a WPBE beliefs must be consistent with strategies along the equilib-
rium path of play. Whenever equilibrium introductory pooling prices imply
that beliefs are determined by initial trust, consistency imposes equality in
equilibrium between trust and average expected quality.
A technical problem is due to the fact that nothing grants the joint ex-
istence of a sequentially rational pure strategy quality choice profile and of
an initial level of consumers’ trust, which, under beliefs (7), makes quality
expectations consistent with equilibrium strategies. Yet, this is only due to
an integer problem, which is easily solved by allowing just one firm to choose
quality in mixed strategies along the equilibrium path of play. Lemma 4
makes this precise and thus grants equilibrium existence. The analytical
expressions of the equilibrium number of entrants and of expected average
33With closed markets, e0 matters only out of equilibrium, so no restriction on it is
imposed.
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quality can be obtained, but this requires solving a third degree polynomial
equation, whose solution is essentially unreadable. Yet, comparative statics
on n is easy to draw, based on our previous results.
Proposition 6. (equilibrium and comparative statics)
Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold and suppose that ζ is sufficiently low as
to allow equilibrium entry by a number of firms higher than γ
cH−cL . Suppose
further that beliefs are given by (7) and that firms play the unique Nash equi-
librium at stage 4, pool on the intuitive introductory price function at stage 3,
make sequentially rational quality choices at stage 2, with the possibility that
one firm randomizes along the equilibrium path of play, and keep entering
until expected profits exceed entry costs. Then there exists only one level of
initial consumers’ trust, which makes beliefs consistent with strategies along
the equilibrium path of play. So under these assumptions a WPBE exists, is
unique and has the following properties.
1. The equilibrium number of entrants is increasing in N , decreasing in
ζ, µ and cH , and trend increasing in γ.
2. The equilibrium values of average expected quality and consumers’ trust
are trend increasing in cH , trend decreasing in µ, unrelated to N and
their relationship with ζ and γ has no stable sign. As the market ma-
tures, there is a shake-out, after which prices rise.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness of a WPBE follow from Lemma 4 in Ap-
pendix.
1. The number of potential entrants matters only when entry costs are so
low that all N firms enter the market. For higher costs, N does not
affect the equilibrium number of entrants. An increase in entry costs
obviously reduces the number of entrants. An increase in the elasticity
of substitution makes competition tougher both at stage 3 and 4. This
reduces firms’ profits and therefore the number of entrants. A rise in
the production cost of high quality obviously discourages high quality
production, and thus decreases consumers’ confidence and reduces the
size of the market, allowing entry by a lower number of firms34. A
rise in γ expands consumers’ demand and allows more firms to enter
34I do not make comparative statics exercises on cL, since, under Assumption 1, their
interpretation would be unclear
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the market. Yet, as shown below, a rise in γ may be associated to a
reduction in trust, which reduces consumers’ demand and thus works
in the opposite direction. Numerical analysis shows that the former
effect tends to prevail, with the number of entrants increasing stepwise
in γ, but that this trend is compatible with occasional stepwise falls of
n after an increase in γ.
2. A rise in cH has two effects (besides that of reducing the number of en-
trants). First, it tends to make low quality relatively more profitable,
since this becomes comparatively cheaper to produce. Second, it raises
firms’ prices. Since low quality firms’ introductory prices are already
distorted upwards with respect to their full information optimum, and
since moreover they set a higher markup than high quality firms ini-
tially do, the profit loss may be higher for low quality than for high
quality firms, so that equilibrium average expected quality may go up
after a rise in cH . Numerical analysis indicates that indeed this tends
to be the case. The elasticity of substitution, the number of poten-
tial entrants, entry costs and consumers’ preference for high quality, all
have the same effects on equilibrium average expected quality, and for
the same reasons (in the case of γ, this is due to the fact that in Lemma
3 in Appendix ∂g
∂γ
< 0 ⇐⇒ e0 > 2(cH−cL)
γ+2(cH−cL) , i.e., given n, and provided
that equilibrium trust is sufficiently high, a rise in γ makes high quality
relatively more profitable, thus fostering an increase in average quality
and in trust; but this, in turn, raises the size of the market and makes
more firms enter, with counterbalancing effects, since a proportional
increase in n and h makes low quality relatively more profitable). Fi-
nally, whenever average expected quality is initially lower than 1 (as is
the case in all the numerical exercises performed), either with certainty
or with positive probability there is a shake-out, and since prices are
decreasing in the number of firms on the market, their time path is
increasing.
While all parameters have the expected impact on the equilibrium number
of entrants, more interesting is to discuss their effect on equilibrium average
expected quality, trust and prices.
Bagwell and Riordan (1991) show that a monopolist uses high and declin-
ing prices to signal high quality in markets with information diffusion. The
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intuition is that price increases are less costly for high quality firms, since
their mark-up is lower, and that in equilibrium low quality firms prefer to be
recognized as such, rather than setting high quality firms’ (upward distorted)
prices. This intuition does not work in the present context, because, by As-
sumption 1, low quality firms prefer any price above their marginal cost to
being recognized as such. They therefore have a strong incentive to pool on
the same price set by high quality firms, provided it covers their marginal
cost. Thus high prices are not credible signals of high quality. In turn, the
possibility to guarantee high quality through low prices is ruled out by As-
sumption 3, which states that the utility difference is not much higher than
the cost difference between high and low quality. These two assumptions
depict an environment in which some firms rationally choose low quality,
mimic the pricing strategy of high quality firms, are able to initially cheat
the market, but, upon discovery, are forced out of the market, and prices
rise over time both because the number of competitors is lower and because
average quality, consumers’ confidence and hence demand are higher.35
Average quality and quality expectations tend to be lower in markets
in which products are closer substitutes, because this erodes the price pre-
mium that motivates firms to produce high quality goods. More specifically,
at equilibrium levels of n, h and e0, a rise in µ lowers high quality firms’
profits both at stage 3 and 4, whereas it raises low quality firms’ profits at
stage 3 (because it reduces their upward price distortion and allows them
to sell more). It thus makes low quality relatively more profitable, and this
effect tends to remain predominant even after considering the equilibrium
decrease in n and in e0.36 More broadly, a higher competitive pressure due
to higher product substitutability imposes a trade-off to consumers between
lower prices and lower average quality.
The number of potential entrants, entry costs and consumers’ preference
for high quality (within the range allowed by the fact that we are considering
the case in which γ is low, relative to cH − cL), have no clear effect on
average quality and on quality expectations. While this is intuitive for N
35In Vanin (2007) I show that, if firms pool on a sufficiently high flat introductory price
function (in which firms set the same introductory price on and off the equilibrium path
of play), then high prices may still guarantee high quality, since the initial profits accruing
to both kind of firms are virtually driven to zero, and only high quality allows repeated
purchase. Yet, although this is the simplest pooling pricing rule, it is not a plausible one.
36To have a concrete example of this, think for instance of many souvenir markets for
tourists.
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and ζ, since these parameters directly affect the number of entrants, but
not the relative profitability of high vs. low quality, it is surprising for γ.
Indeed, the first intuition would be that a higher consumers’ preference for
high quality should raise average market quality. This effect is at work, but
there are also counterbalancing effects: given n and e0, a higher number of
high quality firms increases the relative profitability of low quality, since it
decreases high quality firms’ stage 4 profits; moreover, if consumers expect
a higher average quality, the size of the market increases and this may raise
the number of entrants; additional entrants may then be tempted to choose
low quality, precisely because it has become relatively more profitable; yet,
if this happens and is anticipated, average quality and trust may decrease.
Thus, it is not at all straightforward that a higher consumers’ preference for
high quality translates into higher average market quality.
Finally, it is interesting to notice that a rise in cH , besides reducing the
number of entrants, also has the independent and additional effect of raising
prices. Higher prices favor high over low quality at stage 3 and low over high
quality at stage 4, with the former effect that tends to prevail on the latter.
In summary, when price signals of quality do not work, and provided no
other credible signals are available, the reputation mechanism fails to grant
high quality production by all firms, and a number of interesting phenomena
emerge, like rational consumers who are fooled by some firms, a demand-
driven shake-out, an increasing time path of market prices and a negative
impact of the competitive pressure due to product substitutability on average
market quality and consumers’ trust.
5 Conclusion
I have displayed a linear demand oligopoly model, in which firms endoge-
nously decide whether to enter the market and whether to specialize on high
or low quality products, and then repeatedly interact to sell experience goods
to consumers, who are able to precisely discover a firm’s product quality only
after the first purchase, but who are sufficiently rational to form correct ex-
pectations about average market quality. Although introductory prices may
be used as signals of quality, consumers do not trust them if such signals are
too easy to imitate. This creates a strong incentive for firms to pool on the
same introductory price, independently of their quality. This coordination
incentive, in turn, creates the scope for multiple pooling price equilibria.
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Results are presented for the most intuitive pricing rule, in which low
quality firms mimic high quality firms’ introductory price and, given this,
high quality firms’ introductory price is the most profitable they can set.
This pricing rule is labeled intuitive because not only it survives an adapted
version of the Intuitive Criterion, but it also considers that, since high quality
firms would like to be recognized and low quality firms would not like it, the
former have a sort of advantage, so that it is intuitive to expect that they set
the introductory price that is best for them, given that they are going to be
imitated. The assumption is maintained that the utility difference between
high and low quality is not much higher than the cost difference, thus ruling
out the possibility to guarantee high quality through low prices. As a result,
the market initially hosts both high and low quality firms, which pool on the
same introductory price, which is therefore uninformative.
A number of interesting results emerge: first, rational consumers know
that they are going to be fooled by some firms at the early stage of market
interaction, and therefore do not trust firms’ initial quality claims very much;
second, cheating firms exit the market when discovered and this tends to raise
both average quality and prices at the mature stage of market interaction;
third, higher product substitutability raises competitive pressure, but tends
to lower, besides the number of entrants, both prices and average market
quality.
These main results have been derived under the assumption that low
quality products cannot be profitably sold under perfect information. This
allows to focus on equilibria with pooling introductory prices, which are the
only ones in which actual cheating occurs and consumers are not able to
distinguish a firms’ product quality based on its price. Relaxing this as-
sumption makes the analysis of equilibria with pooling introductory prices
significantly and unnecessarily more complicated, although it would be nec-
essary to investigate markets in which different qualities are sold at different
prices, with no cheating. Preliminary investigation indicates that this ex-
tension promises to yield new interesting results, but that it also poses new
subtleties and therefore requires a separate work.
An analogous argument applies to the assumption that the utility differ-
ence between high and low quality is not much higher than the cost difference,
so that low introductory prices, as an investment in reputation, are not prof-
itable, independently of the degree of market competition. In a companion
paper (Vanin, 2009) I show that the symmetric case, in which high quality
is so much more valuable to consumers than more costly to firms, naturally
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yields full high quality provision, which is signalled through low introductory
prices. While this is intuitive, working out the details of the four stage game
also requires a separate work. The analysis of the intermediate case, in which
investing in reputation may be profitable when competition is low but not
when it is high, would make derivation and presentation of results unneces-
sarily cumbersome, without adding much to intuition. It is to be expected
that, if entry costs are high and the equilibrium number of entrants is low,
then all firms entering the market would choose high quality; in turn, if entry
costs are low and the equilibrium number of entrants is high, results would
resemble those obtained here.
Appendix
Sequentially rational pooling introductory price func-
tions
Lemma 1. (either high or zero trust)
Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. A high quality monopolist has no sequentially
rational introductory price, given beliefs (7), if e0 ∈
(
0, cH−cL
γ
]
.
Proof. Under Assumption 1, α(e0) ∈ (cL, cH ] ⇐⇒ e0 ∈
(
0, cH−cL
γ
]
. In this
case, if a high quality monopolist sets p1 ≥ α(e0), it receives zero demand
and makes zero overall profits. This is not sequentially rational, because
there exists an introductory price p ∈ (cL, α(e0)), sufficiently close to α(e0),
which grants strictly positive overall profits (thanks to Assumption 2). In
turn, ∀p1 < α(e0), ∃ p ∈ (p1, α(e0)), which grants strictly lower initial losses
and the same future profits, and hence strictly higher overall profits.
Lemma 2. (seq. rational pooling introductory price functions)
Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. A pooling introductory price function
p1(n, h, e0) is sequentially rational given beliefs (7), with e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, if
and only if it satisfies the following conditions.37
1. ∀n > 0, ∀h ∈ {0, . . . , n}, p1(n, h, e0) ≥ cL.
37In the cases not explicitly considered no additional constraints are imposed. See
Vanin (2007) for a generalization of this lemma to Assumptions 1 and 2 alone, with
e0 ∈ {0} ∪
(
cH−cL
γ , 1
]
.
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2. p1(1, 0, e0) = pE(1, e0, cL).
3. p1(1, 1, e0) = pE(1, e0, cH).
4. If n > 1 and h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then
(a) p1(n, h, e0) > cL;
(b) if p1(n, 1, e0) ∈ (cL, α(e0)), then piH(n, h, p1(n, 1, e0), e0) ≥ 0.
Proof. 1. If, for some n > 0 and h ∈ {0, . . . , n}, p1(n, h, e0) < cL, then
at the corresponding information set any firm would strictly gain by
deviating to p = cL.
2. Given Assumption 1, e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
implies α(e0) > cH and therefore
α(e0) > cL. In this case, under beliefs (7) a low quality monopolist
faces exogenous quality expectations e0, whatever price it may choose
in the interval (cL, α(e
0)). Only if it chooses its optimal monopoly price
in this interval, no profitable deviations are possible.
3. For a high quality monopolist, an analogous argument applies.
4. When several firms initially enter the market and a pooling introduc-
tory price p1(n, h, e0) ≥ cL is expected, low quality ones have no prof-
itable deviations. Any high quality firm (h > 0) may guarantee itself
zero overall expected profits through a deviation to p > cL; if it devi-
ates to p ≤ cL, it monopolizes the market at both stages 3 and 4, but
it makes initial losses (so that the best such deviation is to p = cL).
(a) Condition p1(n, h, e0) > cL follows from Proposition 3.
(b) A pooling price p1(n, h, e0) ∈ (cL, α(e0)) is sequentially rational if
and only if two inequalities hold: piH(n, h, p
1(n, h, e0), e0) ≥ 0 and
piH(n, h, p
1(n, h, e0), e0) ≥ pi′H(n, h, cL, p1(n, h, e0), 1). Assumption
3 implies that pi′H(n, h, cL, p
1(n, h, e0), 1) < 0, so the only relevant
condition is piH(n, h, p
1(n, h, e0), e0) ≥ 0.38
38Observe that any pooling price p1(n, h, e0) ≥ α(e0) is sequentially rational. At
such price, all firms expect zero demand and zero overall profits. By deviating to
p = cL, a high quality firm earns overall deviation profits pi′H(n, h, cL, p
1(n, h, e0), 1) =
−(cH − cL)
(
1+µ
n+µ
)
γ + pi2(1), which are negative under Assumption 3, because
pi′H(n, h, cL, p
1(n, h, e0), 1) ≤ piH(N, 1, cL, 1) < 0.
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Sequentially rational quality choices
Let f(x, n) ≡ [2n+µ(n−1)][(1+µ)x−
µ
n
]
[n+µ(n−1)][(2+µ)x−µ
n
]2
and g(e0) ≡ (cH−cL)[α(e0)−cH ]
[α(1)−cH ]2 . The func-
tions f and g have the following properties: f( 1
n
, n) = n[2n+µ(n−1)]
4[n+µ(n−1)] ; f(1, n) =
n
2n+µ(n−1) ; given n ≥ 1, f(x, n) is decreasing in x ∈
[
1
n
, 1
]
and f
(
x+ 1
n
, n
)
defines a new function of x, which is just a leftwards shift of f(x, n) by 1/n;
given x ∈ [ 1
n
, 1
]
, f(x, n) is decreasing in n; given x ∈ [0, 1], f (x+ 1
n
, n
)
defines a new function of n, which tends to be increasing (in the sense that
its trend is increasing); given h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, f(h
n
, n) defines a new function
of n, which is increasing; g(e0) is increasing; ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} it holds that
f
(
1
n
, n
)
> g
(
cH−cL
γ
)
and that, if N ≥ 3, then f (1, n) < g(1).
Let eB(n) ≡ cH−cLγ + n[α(1)−cH ]
2
[2n+µ(n−1)](cH−cL)γ and eT (n) ≡
cH−cL
γ
+n[2n+µ(n−1)][α(1)−cH ]
2
4[n+µ(n−1)](cH−cL)γ .
Let x1(n, e
0) and x2(n, e
0) be the solutions of g(e0) = f
(
x+ 1
n
, n
)
and
g(e0) = f (x, n), by x > 0, given e0 ∈ [eB(n), eT (n)], respectively.
Let eM(n) be the solution by x > 0 of g(x) = f
(
x+ 1
n
, n
)
; and eN(n) be the
solution by x > 1
n
of g(x) = f (x, n).
Lemma 3. (sequentially rational quality choice)
Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Assume that e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, that prices
are set according to the pooling introductory price function p1E(n, h, e
0) at
stage 3, and that the unique Nash equilibrium is played at stage 4. Assume
as well N ≥ 8. Then ∀e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, the unique sequentially rational
quality choice for a monopolist is low quality. ∀n ∈ {2, . . . , N},
1. if e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, eB(n)
)
, then the unique sequentially rational quality
choice profile has h(n, e0) = n;
2. if e0 ∈ [eB(n), eT (n)], then a quality choice profile is sequentially ratio-
nal if and only if h(n,e
0)
n
∈ [x1(n, e0), x2(n, e0)]; in particular, x1(n, e0)
and x2(n, e
0) are both decreasing in e0; x1(n, e
0) and eM(n) tend to
be increasing in n; x2(n, e
0) and eN(n) are decreasing in n; the two
intervals [x1(n, e
0), x2(n, e
0)] and [eM(n), eN(n)] are both contained in
[0, 1], may or not overlap, satisfy x2(n, e
0)−x1(n, e0) = 1n and eN(n)−
eM(n) <
1
n
, and
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(a) e0 > eN(n)⇒ x2(n, e0) < e0;
(b) e0 ∈ [eM(n), eN(n)]⇒ e0 ∈ [x1(n, e0), x2(n, e0)];
(c) e0 < eM(n)⇒ x1(n, e0) > e0.
3. if e0 ∈ (eT (n), 1], then the unique sequentially rational quality choice
profile has h(n, e0) = 0.
Proof. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and N ≥ 8, a monopolist pricing ac-
cording to p1E(n, h, e
0) strictly prefers low to high quality ∀e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
39.
Given n ∈ {2, . . . , N} and e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, 1
]
, sequential rationality of the
quality choice profile z(n, e0) may be conveniently rewritten in terms of the
following condition:
f
(
h
n
, n
)
≥ g(e0) ≥ f
(
h+ 1
n
, n
)
, (11)
where only the first inequality matters if h = n and only the second one if
h = 0. ∀n ∈ {2, . . . , N}, eB(n) and eT (n) are the solutions by e0 > 0 of
f(1, n) = g(e0) and f
(
1
n
, n
)
= g(e0), respectively.40
1. If e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ
, eB(n)
)
, then the second inequality of (11) is always
violated for h < n, whereas the first one always holds for h = n.
2. If e0 ∈ [eB(n), eT (n)], then condition (11) holds if and only if h(n,e0)n ∈
[x1(n, e
0), x2(n, e
0)]. The monotonicity properties of the boundaries of
this interval, as well as those of [eM(n), eN(n)], follow from those of f
and g, and the same is true for whether e0 ∈ [x1(n, e0), x2(n, e0)] or
39The assumption of N ≥ 8 plays no other role than to simplify the exposition of a
monopolist’s choice.
40Given n > 1 and e0 ∈
(
cH−cL
γ , 1
]
, the following holds: if h > 0, then piEH(n, h, e
0) ≥
piEL (n, h− 1, e0) ⇐⇒ g(e0) ≤ f
(
h
n , n
)
; if h < n, then piEL (n, h, e
0) ≥ piEH(n, h+ 1, e0) ⇐⇒
g(e0) ≥ f (h+1n , n); piEH(n, n, e0) ≥ piEL (n, n − 1, e0) ⇐⇒ e0 ≤ eB(n); piEL (n, 0, e0) ≥
piEH(n, 1, e
0) ⇐⇒ e0 ≥ eT (n).
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not41. Since the length of the [x1(n, e
0), x2(n, e
0)] interval is 1/n, an
integer h(n, e0) ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that (11) holds exists42.
3. If e0 ∈ (eT (n), 1] (but observe that this interval is empty for high n),
then the first inequality of (11) is always violated for h > 0, whereas
the second one always holds for h = 0.
Trust and consistent expectations
Let h¯(n) be the unique integer such that h¯(n)
n
∈ (eN(n)− 1n , eN(n)].
Lemma 4. (consistency)
Under the assumptions of Lemma 3, suppose that in equilibrium n ∈ {2, . . . , N}
firms enter the market and allow one firm to randomize between high and low
quality. Then both sequential rationality at stages 2, 3 and 4 and consistency
of beliefs (7) along the equilibrium path of play simultaneously hold if and
only if h¯(n) firms choose high quality in pure strategies and
1. if h¯(n)
n
∈ [eM(n), eN(n)], then (n − h¯(n)) firms choose low quality in
pure strategies and e0 = h¯(n)
n
;
2. if h¯(n)
n
∈ (eN(n)− 1n , eM(n)), then (n − h¯(n) − 1) firms choose low
quality in pure strategies,
e0 =
cH − cL
γ
+
n[2n+ µ(n− 1)][h¯(n) + 1 + µh¯(n)][α(1)− cH ]2
[n+ µ(n− 1)][2h¯(n) + 2 + µh¯(n)]2(cH − cL)γ
(12)
and the mixing firm chooses high quality with probability w = ne0−h¯(n).
Proof. Under the above assumptions, consistency of beliefs requires e0 =
h¯(n)
n
if all firms play in pure strategies, with h¯(n) of them choosing high
quality; it requires e0 = E(h)
n
= h¯(n)+w
n
if one firm chooses high quality with
41Observe that eM (n) and eN (n) are decreasing in µ, increasing in (cH − cL), and
increasing in γ when they are high, but decreasing in γ when they are low
42If n · x1(n, e0) ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, then both h(n, e0) = n · x1(n, e0) and h(n, e0) =
n · x1(n, e0) + 1 satisfy condition (11). In any other case, the integer h(n, e0) such that
(11) holds is unique.
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probability w ∈ (0, 1), h¯(n) firms choose high quality in pure strategies and
(n− h¯(n)−1) firms choose low quality in pure strategies. By Lemma 3, given
this, sequential rationality of quality choices implies that either e¯B(n) >
1, or e0 ∈ [eM(n), eN(n)]. In the former case, consistency and sequential
rationality imply e0 = 1 and h(n, 1) = n. In the latter case, p1E(n, h, e
0)
is sequentially rational. In this case, if h¯(n)
n
∈ [eM(n), eN(n)], then we have
consistency and sequential rationality in pure strategies, with e0 = h¯(n)
n
.
If this does not hold and one firm chooses high quality with probability
w ∈ (0, 1), this firm must be indifferent between the two qualities. Given the
other firms’ pure strategy quality choices (i.e., given that h¯(n) other firms
choose high quality and (n−h¯(n)−1) choose low quality), this condition may
be expressed as g(e0) = f
(
h¯(n)+1
n
, n
)
, which, solved for e0, yields (12). Firms
choosing low quality in pure strategies then expect exactly the same profits
as the mixing firm. In turn, firms choosing high quality in pure strategies
expect slightly higher profits, because with probability w there will be h¯(n)+1
competitors at stage 4, but with probability (1−w) there will be only h¯(n).
Yet, no firm has a profitable deviation, since if h¯(n) + 1 firms were to choose
high quality in pure strategies, then expected profits would be lower than in
equilibrium. Then w is determined by the consistency equation e0 = h¯(n)+w
n
,
and this indeed grants that e0 ∈ [eM(n), eN(n)]). Finally, Lemma 3 implies
that for any other number of firms choosing high quality in pure strategies
and any other specification of w, sequential rationality of quality choices and
consistency of beliefs cannot hold at the same time.
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